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PLANIOL CITATIONS BY LOUISIANA
COURTS: I959 - 1966*
Joseph Dainow**
I. INTRODUCTION
A. History
A brief statement of Louisiana's historical background is a
prerequisite to an understanding and appreciation of the subject
matter of this article. Louisiana was first settled by colonists
from France in the early part of the 18th century, and the principal laws in force were the French royal ordinances and the
Custom of Paris.' In 1763, after the Seven Years War, France
lost Louisiana to Spain, but the French colonists physically resisted Spanish rule until a military force in 1766 imposed Spanish dominion and administration. Spanish political control continued for about forty years, and technically the laws of Spain
took the place of the French law. In 1801, Napoleon reacquired
Louisiana for France, but before taking possession of the territory it was secretly sold to the United States in 1803. For
a three-week period in December 1803, a French administrator
took possession for the primary purpose of making the formal
transfer to the United States.
The early American administration favored the introduction
of the Anglo-American "common law," but there was too much
resistance from the inhabitants, and it was decided to let them
keep their "civil law." In 1808, there was published "A Digest
of the Civil Laws now in force in the Territory of Orleans, with
This article brings up to September 1966 a prior report as of June 1965,
which was submitted to the VIlth International Congress of Comparative Law
(Uppsala, August 1966) within the general topic "Use of Comparative Law
in Judicial Decisions." The earlier report was entitled "Tue Use of English
Translation of Planiol by Louisiana Courts"; it was published in 14 AM. J.
CoMP. L. 68 (1965), and is largely incorporated into the present article with
the permission of the Journal.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Hood, The History and Development of the Louisiana Civil Code, 19 LA.
L. REV. 18 (1958), 33 TUL. L. REV. 7 (1958) ; Merrick, Louisiana, Its Law and
Their Sources, 3 ALBANY L.J. 268 (1871) ; 29 A.
L. REGISTER 1 (1890);
1)ainow, The Louisiana Civil Law, in CIVIL CODE OF LOUISIANA Xv (Dainow,
1961 ed.).
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alterations and amendments adapted to its present system of
government"-generally known as the Civil Code of 1808.2
The exact and complete identification of this body of civil
law has not been fully established. Many Spanish sources were
used, but the redactors followed the model of the new French
Civil Code of 1804 (generally known as the Code Napolgon).
Although the Louisiana code was promulgated in two official
languages the original version was written in French while the
English was the translation; there was no Spanish text at all.
For the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825, a considerable amount of
additional material was taken from French sources, and here
also the French version was the original text with the official
English version as a translation (not without errors). Again,
there was no Spanish text.
During this period, an issue was raised as to what civil law
was in force in Louisiana immediately prior to its acquisition
by the United States, and the Supreme Court of Louisiana held
that it was the Spanish civil law. 3 In view of the long Spanish
regime which preceded these first codification measures in Louisiana, certain historical questions (concerning the extensive use
of French law and the French language) have not been fully
answered and documented. 4 Various conjectures have been offered, but they are not within the scope of this article.
Despite the incompleteness of the legal history concerning
Spanish and French sources, and despite the court's ruling in
the Cottin case, there is an absolute consensus that during this
formative period after 1803 the French legal influence was
clearly predominant. Combined with the continuing predominance of the French language, the nineteenth century showed
a very strong influence of French culture patterns. The court
decisions reflect intensive legal scholarship and considerable consultation and use of French legal authorities.
The twentieth century brought marked increases in population, business, industry, individual mobility, transportation, and
communication. There was a marked decrease in the fluency of
the French language and the use of 'French legal materials. At
2. Dainow, The Louisiana Civil Law, in CIVIL CODE OF LOUISIANA, XViii-XXii
(Dainow, 1961 ed.) ; Hood, The History and Development of the Louisiana Civil
Code, 19 LA. L. REV. 18, 22-29 (1958) ; 33 Tim. L. REV. 7, 10-16 (1958).
3. Cottin v. Cottin, 5 Mart. (O.S.) 93 (La. 1817).
4. Dainow, Moreau-Lislet's Notes on Sources of Louisiana Civil Code of 1808,
19 LA. L. REV. 43 (1958).
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the same time, there were various influences of the common law
in Louisiana's legal development.
Louisiana was a part of a growing new country with many
kinds of social and economic problems that called for the same
solutions as prevailed elsewhere. Louisiana's judicial decisions
were reported and classified along with those of the other states.
The practice increased to make more use of cases in lawyers'
arguments, in judges' opinions, and in legal education. It was
easier to adopt the socially acceptable solution of the common
law than to support the interpretation of basic principles without the aid of much doctrinal writing by legal scholars.
This dearth of indigenous doctrinal materials, combined with
the language barrier, made for much less use of French sources
and civil-law method. Concurrently, during the period of the
first third of the present century, the common law offered many
convenient reference works and treatises in English as well as
the mass of reports and digests with all kinds of facilitating
research devices.
During the period of the second one third of this century,
beginning in the early 1930's, there was a resurgence or renaissance of active interest in the civil law as Louisiana's rich legal
heritage and tradition. This emanated primarily from the law
schools, with new emphasis in the instructional programs in the
consultation and use of French (also Spanish) legal source materials and references, and especially in the publication of legal
journals which emphasized the civil law, its sources and its techniques. In particular, the 40 volumes of the Tulane Law Review
and 26 volumes of the Louisiana Law Review now constitute
(and continue to publish) the principal repository of doctrinal
and historical materials on the Louisiana civil law.
Another important factor during this period was the establishment in 1938 of the Louisiana State Law Institute,5 which
had as one of its original major objectives the reassertion and
the strengthening of the civil law in Louisiana. Its first major
project was the Compiled Edition of the Civil Codes of Louisi5. The Louisiana State Law Institute was created by La. Acts 1938, No. 166,
(1950). For description of its organization and purposes,
activities and achievements, see Tucker, The Louisiana State Law Institute, 2 LA.
LA. R.S. 24:201-205

L. REV. 156 (1939) ; Hebert, A State Law Institute as an Agency for Code Revision and Law Reform, 4 MERCER L. REV. 342 (1953) ; Smith, The Role of the Louisiana State Law Institute in Law Improvement and Reform, 16 LA. L. REv. 689
(1956).
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ana,6 which brought together the successive texts of the Louisiana Civil Codes of 1808, 1825, and 1870, with the English and
French texts of the first two, along with the corresponding provisions of the 1804 Code Napolgon or the 1800 Projet of the
French Civil Code (with English as well as French text). In
due course, the Institute completed a compilation of statutes
related to the Civil Code (1942) ; a Criminal Code, which was
adopted in 1942; the Revised Statutes, which were adopted in
1950; a Code of Civil Procedure, which went into effect in 1961;
and a Code of Criminal Procedure, which was adopted in 1966.
From the very beginning, one of the Institute's chief concerns has been the small amount of doctrinal materials on Louisiana civil law. One method of meeting this problem was a program of English translations to make available and to encourage
the consultation and use of doctrinal works on the parent legal
system, the civil law of France. The first major project in this
category was the translation of the Planiol Civil Law Treatise,
which suffered many vicissitudes and delays but which finally
appeared in 1959. 7 Three other Institute translations have already been completed; these are G~ny, "Mgthode d'Interprdtation et Sources en Droit Privg Positif" in 1963,8 and Aubry and
Rau's treatises on "Obligations" in 1965, and "Property" in
1966. 9 Additional translation projects now in preparation include Aubry and Rau on "Donations," and Baudry-Lacantinerie
on "Prescription." As the utilization of the Planiol translation
becomes more frequent and habitual, the Louisaina legal profession will move more easily into the use of the other civil law
translations.
From an idealistic point of view, the use of translations is
generally objectionable. Not only is some of the original meaning lost in the process, but the whole purpose and significance
6. 3

LA. LEGAL ARCHIVES, COMPILED EDITION OF THE CIVIL CODES OF LOU-

(Part I, 1940; Part II, 1942)
pursuant to La. Acts 1938, No. 165.

ISIANA,

(Joseph Dainow, Reporter),

published

7. PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LouISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE)
(6 volumes)
(1959) [hereinafter cited as
PLANIOL].
8. G]tNY, MI\THODE D'INTERPRETATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVt POSITIF
(AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, J. Mayda,

translator) (1963).
9. AUBRY &
TRANSLATION BY
(1965) ; AUBRY
TRANSLATION BY
(1966).

RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS OBLIGATIONS
(AN
ENGLISH
THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, A. N. Yiannopoulas,
ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS -PROPERTY
(AN
ENGLISH
THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, J. Mayda, translator)
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of the consultation may be depreciated. It must be granted that
the ideal solution is rather a fluency in the foreign language
which would result in consulting the original works and many
more of them.
A realistic appraisal of the situation reveals the impossibility
of French becoming a current language of the Louisiana legal
profession. Accordingly, the available choice is not as between
using a translation or consulting the French original, but a more
limited choice between the use of a translation or having no
consultation at all (except by a few experts). On this basis,
translations are warranted and desirable; they can prove extremely useful.
The Institute is also trying to sponsor and to encourage the
writing of shorter or longer treatises on the various topics of
the Louisiana civil law.
It may well be asked why Louisiana has not produced more
doctrinal works on its civil law. Two reasons immediately come
to mind. Until recently, the number of those in the legal profession (including the law schools) was not sufficient to make any
such publication commercially feasible. That is why the law
reviews with their university support became the principal outlet
for such materials, in small units of leading articles, comments,
and casenotes. Secondly, the potential writers are the professors
of Civil law who have never been numerous enough or free
enough from other assignments to do such comprehensive
writing.
As we approach the last one third of the current century,
the focus in the interest concerning the nature of Louisiana's
legal system is shifting. Whereas there had been both open and
subtle conflict between the civil law and the common law, each
vying, as it were, for the controlling and determinative characteristic of the system, the realization is spreading that there
is no question of victory or defeat by the one or the other but
rather a combination of both. There is a widening acceptance
of the fact that the Louisiana legal system is sui generis, while
falling into what might be called a category of "mixed jurisdictions."
There is no longer a debate or dialogue about the ascendancy
of the civil law or the common law, but in the face of the lan-
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guage gap and the dearth of comprehensive Louisiana doctrinal
materials every effort must be made to preserve a maximum of
the civil-law heritage and the civil-law method in an atmosphere
where it is easier to use the common-law materials and techniques. The most effective single achievement of this sort has
bedii the 1959 English translation of Planiol's "Traitg kl6mentaire de Droit Civil."
B. Planiol
The history of the Planiol translation project is more fully
stated in an article in the American Journal of Comparative
Law.10 Suffice it here to say that the Planiol treatise was chosen
for translation by reason of the unanimous acclaim it had received in France and in other countries for its scholarship, comprehensiveness, clarity, readability, simple style, and conciseness
of ideas. It combines Roman law and historical perspective with
modern developments and comparative law; it also shows a
realistic appreciation for the decisions of the courts.
When the Louisiana State Law Institute decided to translate Planiol, the current edition was of 1938 and 1939, and the
decision to use this text was not changed even though later editions appeared before much progress had been made on the
actual translation. There were two principal reasons: (a) the
editions of 1938 (vol. 3) and 1939 (vols. 1 and 2) are the last
ones in which the spirit and content and form of Planiol's personal work were preserved; thereafter Ripert made substantial
changes and incorporated more of his own ideas, and (b) the
newer developments in French law and French legal thought,
reflecting the modern evolution in the French social and political
structure, are less significant in the understanding and interpretation of the Louisiana Civil Code which is more closely related
to the older French texts and traditions.
With the interruption of the war years, the problems incident
to translators, and those in getting the translation printed, it
was only in October 1959 that the work was actually published
by the West Publishing Company in a very fine edition. The
translators were Judge Pierre Crabites (vol. 1), Judge Robert
L. Henry (vol. 2), and Professor Jaro Mayda (vol. 3) ; in the
final editorial preparation of the manuscript by the then Direc10. Dainow, The Planiol Treatise on the Civil Law: French and Louisiana
Law for Comparative Study, 10 Am. J. Comp. L. 175 (1961).
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tor of Legal Research of the Louisiana State Law Institute,
Carlos E. Lazarus, the parts were co-ordinated into a coherent
whole.
In anticipation of this Planiol translation, the present writer
compiled a complete system of cross-references from the Louisiana Civil Code to the Planiol treatise. The references are to
volume and section of the French original, which were preserved
in the English translation. These cross-references first appeared
in 1952 in the Louisiana Civil Code Annotated' as the first item
in the cross-references group under each article, and now the
whole set is incorporated not only in the Planiol translation but
also in other places. This concordance opens the Planiol treatise
immediately to an appropriate place of reference as the starting
point for inquiry and examination.
In a review of the Planiol Treatise when it appeared in 1959,
I used the following opening and closing paragraphs:
"The publication of a single work will sometimes have a
slowly reverberating but very far-reaching effect. Such may
well be the case for this English translation of Planiol in the
future development of the civil law of Louisiana."
"It can hardly be expected that the publication of this
Planiol Civil Law Treatise in English will immediately or
in the very near future assure to the civil law of Louisiana
all its ancestral character and flavor. It would be unrealistic
to think of turning time back to the starting point. The
present law incorporates the life of the people and cannot be
erased. However, just as life moves on, so does a legal system
live and breathe. In the evolution and development of the
civil law that lies ahead in Louisiana, this English version
of the Planiol Civil Law Treatise can have a long-range, per12
vasive, and healthy influence.'
It was the hope and expectation that the Planiol translation
would increase and improve the civil-law part of the approach
to solution of legal problems by the Louisiana legal profession,
and now that seven years have elapsed an attempt can be made
to estimate the extent to which this has been realized. Actually,
there has never been any period in Louisiana jurisprudence dur11. LA. CIVIL CODE ANN.

(15 vols.)

(West, 1952-1953).

12. Dainow, Review of Planiol, Civil Law Treatise, 20 LA. L.
(1959).

REV. 191,

196
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ing which it can be said that there was no consultation of French
and civil law authorities. The present attempt to evaluate the
influence of the Planiol translation has the limitation that there
is no accurate basis of knowing exactly what would have happened if it did not exist. The fact remains, however, that many
lawyers and practically all the appellate judges now regularly
consult Planiol in connection with questions which previously
would rarely be researched in French or continental materials.
Accordingly, without feeling the need to assert or suggest any
mathematical comparison, it is interesting and significant to see
just what has actually happened since the publication of the
Planiol translation.
In proceeding to this examination, it must be realized that
the scope of the inquiry is necessarily limited to the reported
decisions of the Louisiana appellate courts. 13 How much use has
been made of Planiol in the trial courts, in cases which did not
go to appeal, is not ascertainable. Nor is account here taken of
the very extensive use of the Planiol translation in connection
with law school teaching and law review writing as well as other
scholarly research in Louisiana. Neither is any attempt made
to incorporate another area of influence and significance of this
Planiol translation, outside of Louisiana, in English-language
territories of civil law or mixed jurisdictions as well as its use
for comparative law purposes (especially for teaching and research) in other American states and in English-language countries of the common law or other legal systems.
It was presumably this last-named consideration which motivated the translator's use of some common-law terminology (e.g.,
"agency" instead of "mandate," or "easement" instead of "servitude"). From a very orthodox civil-law position, this may be
regrettable despite its help as a bridge of understanding and
communication. In any event, this choice of terminology should
not be considered as any serious detraction from the beneficial
values of the translation. At the same time, it is hoped that
future translations will utilize a minimum of common-law terminology.
The period covered by this article is from October 1959 to
13. Since the judicial reorganization in 1960, a more extensive final jurisdiction has been exercised by the courts of appeal; many applications are made to
the Supreme Court for writs of certiorari and review but relatively few are
granted.
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September 1966. In the state courts, 62 cases were found in which
there were 67 citations of Planiol (and sometimes other French
authorities). In the federal court cases dealing with Louisiana
law problems, a cursory check of about twenty volumes of reports did not reveal any Planiol citations, nearly all the subject
matter being in areas for which there could be no occasion to
consult French law. Accordingly, this study is restricted to cases
in the state courts.

II. THE CASES
In describing these cases and the Planiol citations, there
might be some merit in presenting them in chronological order
on account of the cumulative effect of their use. An attempt
along this line indicated that such an arrangement would produce more length than interest. Instead, a few of the earlier
cases will be used to describe and explain some of the Louisiana
techniques and methodology, while the main presentation of
cases will be grouped by major areas of subject matter.
Since nearly all of the Planiol citations appear in cases dealing with problems of a civil-law nature (as distinguished from
the areas of federal law, uniform laws, and public law areas like
constitutional law and criminal law which do not have a civillaw source or background), the grouping covers the main areas
of the Civil Code as follows: persons, property, successions, obligations, special contracts, and prescription.
A statistical analysis of the different ways in which the
Planiol citations are used and an evaluation will be made in subsequent sections of this article.
A.

Illustrations of Method and Purpose

The first judicial opinion to cite the new Planiol translation
was in the court of appeal case of Washington v. Washington.14
Claiming to be the widow in necessitous circumstances, the petitioner brought suit against the heirs for $1,000, as provided by
article 3252 of the Louisiana Civil Code. '5 The heirs contended
14. 116 So.2d 125, 129 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959), amended and affirmed, 241
La. 35, 127 So. 2d 491 (1961).
15. "The privileges which extend alike to movables and immovables are the
following:
"Whenever the widow or minor children of a deceased person shall be left
in necessitious circumstances, and not possess in their own rights property to the
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that the widow should have demanded a separation of patrimony,
and that this right had been lost by the three months prescription provided for this action under article 1456 of the Louisiana
Civil Code.16 The defendants' position was supported by an
earlier decision in Danna v. Danna,17 where the widow's right to
claim her privilege was held to have prescribed after a lapse
of three months. However, the court was much more impressed
with an opposite holding in Beck v. Beck,1 8 wherein it was held
that the prescription of three months did not apply under a
factual situation similar to the case at bar. After discussing
and quoting from the Beck case, the court added, "See also
Planiol -Civil Law Treatise, Vol. 3, Part 2, 2170 et seq. Separation of Patrimony."
The chapter in Planiol on this subject sets out a reasonably
brief but very clear and complete outline covering (1) the general concept, (2) cases of applicability, (3) forms of the benefit
of separation, (4) effects of the benefit of separation, and (5)
loss of right to claim separation. The cases for which the separation of patrimony is available do not include the fact situation in question, and from the general description of the institution and its functions, it follows that the case at bar was not
within its intended scope.
As cited by the court, the Planiol reference was used not so
much as the basis for its decision as an additional make-weight
for the court's adoption of the holding and interpretation of the
Beck case, rather than the Danna case. If the Planiol position
had been different, one can only conjecture what the court would
have done; but the mere thought of this issue implies that some
importance would have attached to the consultation of Planiol.
amount of One Thousand Dollars, the widow or the legal representatives of the
children, shall be entitled to demand and receive from the succession of the deceased husband or father, a sum which added to the amount of property owned
by them, or either of them, in their own right, will make up the sum of one
thousand dollars, and which amount shall be paid in preference to all other debts,
except those secured by the vendor's privilege on both movables and immovables,
conventional mortgages, and expenses incurred in selling the property. The
surviving widow shall have and enjoy the usufruct of the amount so received
from her deceased husband's succession, during her widowhood, which amount
shall afterwards vest in and belong to the children or other descendants of the
deceased husband."
16. "The suit of separation of patrimony must be instituted within three
months from the express or tacit acceptance of the heirs; after the expiration
of this term, it is not admitted."
17. 161 So. 348 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1935).
18. 181 So. 635 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1938).
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At this point, it is relevant to inject the question whether it
was appropriate to consult French sources with reference to the
problem in the principal case. The defendants' contention put
in issue the applicability of the separation of patrimony. This
subject is dealt with in articles 1444-1464 of the Louisiana Civil
Code. The Concordance Table and the Compiled Edition of the
Civil Codes of Louisiana show immediately that these provisions
correspond to articles 878-881 of the Code Napoleon. While the
Louisiana Code has more articles than the French (this is found
in many places, making 3556 articles in the Louisiana Civil Code
as compared with 2281 in the Code Na polgon) the basic concept
and its applicability are the same.
Incidentally, on a secondary issue which no longer has any
practical importance, it may be noted that the length of the prescriptive period was changed in Louisiana. The first Louisiana
Civil Code of 180819 followed the Code Napolgon0 almost literally
in providing a three-year prescription with regard to movables,
and permitting the action with regard to immovables as long as
the property is in the hands of the heir. This was changed in
the Louisiana Civil Code of 182521 to fix the prescriptive period
at three months for any kind of property, and thus it has been
carried into the present Code.2 2 In the 1822 Report of the Commissioners (generally referred to as the "Projet") the change
is explained as follows: "We have thought best to abridge the
time in which this extraordinary privilege of the separation of
patrimony can be exercised, in order not to place too long a
space between the opening of the succession and the time when
' 28
the heir can freely dispose of the effects composing it."
The first decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court to cite the
Planiol translation was Gueno v. Medlenka.24 The naked owner
(remainder-man) and the usufructuary (life estate) both executed oil, gas, and mineral leases on the property, and the case
presented for decision the following questions: (a) what are
their respective interests in the undiscovered oil, gas, and other
19. La. Civil Code of 1808, p. 202, art. 232.
20. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 880.
21. La. Civil Code art. 1409 (1825).
22. L.A. CIVIL CODE art. 1456 (1870).
23. ADDITIONS AND AMENDMENTS TO THE CIVIL

CODE OF TILE STATE OF LOUISIANA, PROPOSED IN OBEDIENCE TO THE RESOLUTION OF TItE LEGISLATURE OF THE
14TH OF MARCH 1822, BY THE JURISTS COMMISSIONEa FOR THAT PURPOSE (New

Orleans 1823), reprinted as 1 LOUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES 198 (1937).

24. 238 La. 1081, 117 So. 2d 817 (1960).
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fugacious minerals, and (b) which one, if either, had the right
to lease the property for the purposes of exploration and production.
Article 552 of the Louisiana Civil Code provides: "The usufrucutary has a right to the enjoyment and proceeds of mines
and quarries in the land subject to the usufruct, if they were
actually worked before the commencement of the usufruct; but
he has no right to mines and quarries not opened." It is a wellestablished interpretation that exploration for oil and gas is
25
mining.
The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808 did not contain a corresponding provision, but on the recommendation of the 1822 Report of the Commissioners20 an addition was adopted as article
545 of the Civil Code of 1825. In its basic concept and essential
elements, this was the same as article 598 of the Code Napolgon;
and it has been continued without change as the present article
552 of the current Revised Civil Code of 1870.
With the aid of this bridge to cross over into the French
sources, the court in the principal case not only consulted the
Planiol treatise but actually relied on substantial quotations of
its text as the exclusive ratio decidendi in reaching the following conclusions.
(1) The usufructuary has no right to minerals which may
be obtained from the land (for the first time) after the commencement of the usufruct. Planiol explains that what is extracted from a mine is not a product of the soil but the soil itself,
and the exploitation of a mine leads inevitably to its exhaustion.
The usufructuary's right to continue an operation already in
existence is an exceptional right by express codal provision, but
27
he may not start such an operation.
(2) The naked owner has the right to search for the minerals
during the existence of the usufruct and reduce them to his possession. Planiol's discussion of article 598 of the French Civil
Code and of the French law of April 21, 1810 (concerning government permits for any mineral exploitation), clearly indicates
25. Elder v. Ellerbe, 115 La. 990, 66 So. 337 (1914) ; Jackson v. Shaw, 151
La. 795, 92 So. 339 (1922).
26. 1 LOUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES, PROJET OF THE CIVIL CODE OF 1825,
52 (1937).
27. 1 PLANIOL no. 2794.
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that the usufructuary's right is limited to continue the operation
of mines and quarries already opened at the time the usufruct
commences; the naked owner has the right to open new mines
during the usufruct even though he needs a government permit
28
under the 1810 law.
Accordingly, the court sustained as valid and enforceable the
mineral lease granted by the naked owner and authorized an
entry upon the land for exploration and production purposes.
The availability of the Planiol translation has also encouraged
a more general consultation of French sources, as illustrated in
the case of Daum v. Lehde. 29 Subsequent to an agreement for
the sale of a piece of property but prior to the consummation
of the sale itself, there was substantial fire damage to the improvements on the property. The prospective purchaser brought
suit for specific performance, and one of the alternative demands
was to have the defendant complete the sale for the original
price, with delivery of the property in its fire-damaged condition
together with the insurance money received on account of the
fire loss. This claim was based upon article 2220 of the Louisiana
Civil Code, which reads as follows:
"When the thing is destroyed, rendered unsalable, or lost,
without the fault of the debtor, he is bound, if he has any
claim or action for indemnification, on account of that thing,
to make over the same to the creditor."
Since there was no previous judicial interpretation of this
article in relation to a similar fact situation, and since this provision is verbatim the same as article 1303 of the Code Napolgon,
reference to the French sources was both appropriate and useful.
In dismissing the plaintiff's contention, and holding that the
clause "claim or action for indemnification" does not include
insurance money, Chief Justice Fournet of the Louisiana Supreme Court relied exclusively on French authorities. In addition to Planiol, these consisted of Colin & Capitant (1953), Bousquet (1805), and one case (1873).30
28. 1 PLANIOL nos. 2795, 2819, 2827.
29. 239 La. 607, 119 So. 2d 481 (1960).
30. 2 PLANIOIL no. 628; 2 COLIN ET CAPITANT, COUIS ELEMEN'IRE DE DROIT
CIVIL FRANQAIS 406, § 588 (2d ed. 1953) ; 3 BOUSQUET. EXPLICATION DU CODE
CIVIL 370 (1805) ; Douai, 3 Jan. 1873; see 3 FUZIER-'IERMAN ET DARRAS, CODE
CIVIL ANNOTE 240, art. 1303 (1896), in Daum v. I.ehde, 239 La. 607, 613-14,
119 So. 2d 481, 483 (1960).
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An unusual use of the Planiol citation occurred in the case
of Kreppein v. Demarest 1 The question at issue hinged upon
the validity of a pledge for which there must be a delivery of
the thing pledged into the possession of the creditor or of a
third person agreed upon by the parties. 32 A decision of the
Louisiana Supreme Court, not long before, upheld a pledge
where the thing (an insurance policy) was found among the
effects of the deceased pledgor, upon the theory that the debtor
held the property for the account of the creditor and that as
between the'parties possession by the creditor is not necessary. 3
In the case at bar, the court of appeal was not willing to go this
far, and, in support of its reluctance, it quoted the critical observations (about the Louisiana Supreme Court decision) already
published in two local law reviews plus the statement from
34
Planiol that there can be no pledge without delivery.
Even in cases where there is ample direct authority in the
Louisiana Civil Code and the decisions of the Louisiana courts,
it is not without significance to find the Planiol citation as well.
The mere fact of its inclusion is evidence that it was considered
worthwhile consulting and citing. This occurred in the case of
Hidalgo v. Dupuy,35 where the issue involved the interpretation
of Louisiana Civil Code article 2093 concerning obligations in
solido (which corresponds verbatim to article 1202 of the Code
Napoleon). The court held that a negligent car driver and his
liability insurer are solidary obligors without express stipulation
to that effect; consequently, the interruption of liberative prescription as against the insurer also interrupted prescription
against the driver. After citing five Louisiana cases the court
added "See also" three more Louisiana cases, and the Planiol
6
reference was included for corroboration.3
7
The reverse process was followed in Succession of Williams
for the interpretation of Louisiana Civil Code article 1707 concerning accretion in the event of the predecease of one legatee
under a conjoint legacy. After pointing out that this article is
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

120 So. 2d 301 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1960).
L.A. CIVIL CODE arts. 3152, 3162 (1870).
Scott v. Corkern, 231 La. 368, 91 So. 2d 569 (1956).
2 PLANIOL no. 2401 (discussion of FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 2076).
122 So. 2d 639 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960).
2 PLANIOL nOS. 736, 741.
124 So. 2d 924 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1960).
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the same as article 1044 of the French Civil Code, and quoting
from Planiol, 38 the court stated:
"After reading these articles and the comment of Planiol
we cannot escape the conclusion that our Codal article and
the article of the Code Napoleon have application only when
one of the conjoint legatees dies before the death of the
testator." 9
Following this conclusion, the court cited and discussed six Louisiana cases to the same effect as well as other local references.
B. Arrangement by Subject Matter
There is an unavoidable measure of arbitrariness in this kind
of classification. Many cases involve more than one issue. For
present purposes, this is not important. Neither is the decision
on the substantive issue of special significance. Looking primarily at the point in connection with which Planiol was cited,
the 62 cases divide themselves into the following groups: persons and family, 8; property, 7; successions, 10; obligations, 18;
special contracts (sale, lease, pledge, etc.), 10; prescription
(liberative and acquisitive), 5.
(1) Persons and family. In Scott v. La Fontaine,40 a mother
instituted suit for damages on account of the death of her minor
child. Recovery in Louisiana law is limited to lawful parents,
and in this case the child was illegitimate. The court held that
a purported legitimation of the child by notarial act almost one
year after the death was of no effect. Louisiana Civil Code
article 201, and the corresponding Code Napolgon article 332,
permit the legitimation of "deceased children who have left
issue" for the benefit of the grandchildren. In denying the possibility of posthumous legitimation where there was no issue,
the court established this interpretation of the Louisiana code
article on the basis of Planiol's 4 1 explanation and comments
about the corresponding French provision. No other authorities
were cited.
In Lambert v. Lambert,4 2 the husband brought an action in
disavowal on the grounds of remoteness and the physical im38. 3 PLANIOL no. 2859.
39. 124 So. 2d 924, 926 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1960).
40. 148 So. 2d 780 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962), writ denied, "no error of law,"
244 La. 144, 150 So. 2d 768 (1963).
41. 148 So. 2d 780, 782 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) ; I PLANIOL no. 1554.
42. 164 So. 2d 661 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
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possibility of cohabitation at the time of conception because the
child was born to his wife 216 days after her return from California where she had spent five months. The medical evidence
indicated that the child had had a normal gestation period of
nine months. According to the Civil Code articles 184-189, the
presumption of paternity covers a gestation period of 180 days
at the beginning of a new marriage and 300 days after the dissolution of a former marriage. The court applied this same range
so as to require proof of remoteness during the full period of
300 days to 180 days before the birth. This express rule of Code
Napolgon article 312 (par. 2) was not carried into the Louisiana
Civil Code, although all the principles concerning paternity and
disavowal did come from that source. In adopting this meaning
for the Louisiana code provision - despite the medical evidence
and the trial court's ruling in favor of the husband - the court
relied on Planiol's 48 historical explanation of the policy to favor
legitimacy. In corroboration, the court also cited the opinion
of a Louisiana doctrinal writer 4 4 that, for disavowal,' remoteness
must exist during the entire period from 300 to 180 days before
birth.
A more frequent kind of use for the citation of Planiol has
been to supplement or corroborate Louisiana and other authorities to the same effect. In an interdiction case, 45 the under,curatrix was allowed to participate in a suit for termination of
the interdiction on the basis of articles of the Louisiana Civil
Code and Code of Civil Procedure. The court continued, "In addition, counsel . . .cites . .. Planiol. '' 40 This formula assumes
no responsibility, but its inclusion is not without significance.
47
For the question of good faith in a putative marriage case,
the court relied on earlier Louisiana decisions, one of which is
emphasized by requoting excerpts from Marcad6 and the Planiol
French original (prior to the appearance of the English translation). In another case, 48 the court held that a married woman,
running for elective office against her judicially separated husband, cannot use his name preceded by "Mrs.," but must use
her own name, Mrs. Laura Verret Wilty (instead of Mrs. Vernon
43. Id. at 664-65; 1 PLANIOL DOs. 1376-1377, 1431.
44. SAUNDERS, LECTURES ON THE CIVIL CODE 46 (1925).
45. Interdiction of Polmer, 141 So. 2d 696 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
46. Id. at 702; 1 PLANIOL no. 1865.
47. Succession of Davis, 142 So. 2d 481, 485 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
48. Wilty v. Jefferson Parish Democratic Executive Committee, 245 La. 145,
157 So. 2d 718 (1963), reversing 156 So. 2d 800 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
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J. Wilty, Jr.). The concurring justice cited a number of Louisiana authorities and referred to Planio 49 to show-that Louisiana follows the civil-law doctrine in contrast to the common-law
fiction of merger of personalities. However, there is no reference
to another Planiol section5" which recognizes also that "a universal right exists to designate a married woman by her husband's name" as well as the right to use her own name.
An unusual and significant use of Planiol was made in the
case of Romero v. Leger,51 where a majority of the Third Circuit
Court of Appeal held that in a divorce suit the wife cannot obtain
from the husband an advance from community assets for the
payment of court costs and attorney fees, finding no statute or
code article to support such a claim. While the minority judge
entered a concurring opinion because he felt it was appropriate
to follow an old decision of the Supreme Court, he really expressed a dissent on the merits of the issue. In support of his
position, he cited Planiol, 52 whose conclusion (in favor of allowing costs of suit) is based upon several French cases dated between 1889 and 1933. As pointed out by the concurring judge,
there is no policy reason not to include necessary legal expenses
along with necessary food and lodging in the allowance to a wife
who is suing for separation or divorce. Furthermore, he considered that it was only fair and equitable for the wife's court
costs to be advanced from the community assets just as the
husband would naturally draw his legal expenses from the same
source in which they each own a one half interest. The use of
the Planiol translation in this way, in opposition to the Louisiana
jurisprudence, undoubtedly contributed to the legislative correction of this imbalance in the next regular session of the legisla53
ture.
A recent case 4 demonstrates how the legal profession is
acquiring the habit of looking for help in Planiol. A notarial
act of adoption had not been registered and the court held that
the adoption was invalid and without effect. The claimant urged
Planiol's5 5 comment and the French civil code articles that lack
49. 245 La. 145, 172, 157 So. 2d 718, 727 (1963) ; 1

PLANIOL

no. 390.

50. 1 PLANIOL no. 392.

51. 133 So. 2d 897 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
52. id. at 899; 1 PLANIOL no. 1249.
53. La. Acts 1962, No. 178, amending LA. CIVIL CODE art. 155 (1870)
the wife's legal expenses a liability of the community.
54. In re d'Asaro, 167 So. 2d 391 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
55. Id. at 394, 396; 1 PLANIOL no. 1595.

made
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of registration did not entail the complete nullity of the adoption.
However, since the matter of adoption is purely statutory in
Louisiana as elsewhere, the court rejected the French developments and followed the Louisiana statutes and jurisprudence,
which are more consistent with the laws of other American
states.
The production of oil in Louisiana has not only created new
interest in old forgotten properties, but it has also brought to
the surface more than the physical minerals. In Hibbert v.
Mudd,", the ownership of land and the validity of a mineral
lease depended upon whether it was legally possible to acknowledge the illegitimate children of a miscegenous union. The majority of the court of appeal held that this was not possible by
reason of Civil Code article 204, which precludes acknowledgment
of "children whose parents were incapable of contracting marriage at the time of conception." The dissenting judge cited
Planiol5 in support of the proposition that a statute should not
be applied mechanically when the circumstances of its legislative history do not show an intent to reach the question on which
the present case hinges. Without engaging in the actual merits
of the issue (which have not yet been finally decided), suffice
it to say that Planiol's argument strikes a dominant civil law
key in asserting that the law should not be mechanically interpreted to defeat it own purpose of social welfare, and that the
logical method should be tempered by considerations of utility
and equity. 58
(2) Property. Of the cases in this group, one (involving the
mineral rights of the usufructuary and naked owner) is fully
treated in an earlier part of this article. 59 Another deals with
a problem of expropriation"0 and held unconstitutional a Louisiana statute which purported to vest ex parte eminent domain
power in a state agency. In addition to the state constitution,
the court cited state and federal court cases and other authorities. The help supplied by the Planio 61 citation could not have
been very great, but as a general reference it supported the doc56. Hibbert v. Mudd, 187 So. 2d 503 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
"the judgment complained of is not final," 190 So. 2d 233 (La. 1966).
57. 1 PLANIOL nos. 216, 224.
58. 1 PLANIOL no. 224.
59. Gueno v. Medlenka, 238 La. 1081, 117 So. 2d 817 (1960), discussed in
text accompanying notes 24-28 supra.
60. State v. Phares, 245 La. 534, 159 So. 2d 144 (1963).
61. Id. at 540, 159 So, 2d.at 147; 1 PLANIOL no. 2443.'
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trine that payment in advance seems to be an attribute of the
civil law. A third case 62 involved a question of co-ownership in
indivision between the surviving parent and children in a succession proceeding, and Planiol6 3 was cited as a general reference
to clarify and to apply the characteristics of undivided ownership. Another use of Planiol as a general reference was made in
Giroir v. Dumesni 6 4 in connection with identifying the essential
attributes of usufruct. 5
After two trials and two appeals, the case of Acadia-Vermilion Rice Irrigating Co. v. Broussard was still not settled. In
the first reported decision, 66 one issue turned on the classification of a servitude of aqueduct through a canal between two
levees, and the court cited Planiol 6 in reaching its conclusion
that such a servitude is "continuous" as well as apparent, and
therefore can be acquired by prescription under Civil Code
article 765. This and related code articles are derived from
French sources, and in the second appeal6 8 Planiol was cited
again6 9 in connection with the question of determining when a
servitude is used or possessed adversely to the servient property
owner, and when there is merely a precarious use by sufferance
or permission which would not satisfy the requirement of possession for prescription.
Columbia Gulf Transmission Co. v. Fontenot7° was an expropriation case, and on an incidental problem of servitudes the
court quoted Planiol to support its interpretation of Civil Code
articles 796 and 79871 that partial non-use of a servitude for the
prescriptive period of ten years7 2 "has the same extinctive effect
62. Succession of Heckert, 160 So. 2d 375 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).

63. Id. at 381; 1

PLANIOL

no. 2497.

64. Giroir v. Dumesnil, 248 La. 1037, 184 So. 2d 1 (1966).
65. 1 PLANIOL no. 2775.
66. Acadia- Vermilion Rice Irrigating Co. v. Broussard, 175 So. 2d 856 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1965).
67. 1 PLANIOL nos. 2894-2899.

68. 185 So. 2d 908 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
69. 1 PLANIOL nos. 2955-2956.
70. 187 So. 2d 455 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
71. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 796 (1870): "The mode of servitude is subject to
prescription as well as the servitude itself, and in the same manner.
"By mode of servitude, in this case, is understood the manner of using the
servitude as is prescribed in the title."
id. art. 798: "If, on the contrary, the owner has enjoyed a right less extensive
than is given him by his title, the servitude, whatever be its nature, is reduced
to that which is preserved by possession during the time necessary to establish
prescription."
72. Id.

art. 789.
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as total non-use and that it diminishes the servitude to the extent
''
that no use had been made of it. 73

(3) Successions. Among the cases in this group are some
very significant uses of the Planiol translation. In fact, the first
reference to the Planiol translation involved the claim of a widow
in necessitous circumstances where the court used Pianiol in
support of departing from one of its own prior decisions; this
74
case has been fully discussed above.
Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Boudoin 75 was a case with many
complex and interwoven facts and issues; there were several
judgments including reversals. The application for a second rehearing before the Third Circuit Court of Appeal was refused,
but two judges dissented. Concerning questions of warranty as
applied against the heir who accepts unconditionally, a dissenting
judge relied principally on Planiol 76 along with articles of the
Louisiana Civil Code and Code of Civil Procedure. In addition
to this dissent-it may be noted in passing-there were critical
7
doctrinal observations about the final majority judgment. 7
Six of these succession cases include seven instances in which
Planiol is cited (a) as the exclusive authority for decision or
(b) as the primary reference with supplementation of Louisiana
78
authorities to the same effect. The former includes one case
where Planiol indicated that the rules of revocation for ingratitude of a donee are not applicable to unworthiness of an intestate
9
7

heir.

The latter group includes a reference in this same case where
Planiol8O supports the conclusion that the husband who killed
his wife and later committed suicide was not unworthy because
there had been no conviction in a criminal proceeding. In this
category, there is also the case involving accretion by a surviving
73. 1 PLANIOL no. 2979. Evidently the court did not accept the distinction
made by the Prench Court of Cassation and described in the latter part of the
same paragraph of Planiol.
74. Washington v. Washington, 116 So. 2d 125 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959), discussed in text accompanying notes 14-23 supra.
75. 154 So. 2d 239 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963), writ refused, "no error of law,"
245 La. 54, 156 So. 2d 601 (1963).
76. 154 So. 2d at 254; 2 PLANIOL nos. 1476, 1480, 1482, 1484.
77. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1963-1964 TermUsufruct, 25 LA. L. REv. 302, 304, 305 (1965) ; The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1963-1964 term - Sales, 25 LA. L. Rsv. 325, 329 (1965).
78. Succession of Medica, 163 So. 2d 425 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964), writ denied,
"no error of law," 246 La. 379, 164 So. 2d 362 (1964).
79. 163 So. 2d at 428; 3 PLANIOL no. 1748.
80. 163 So. 2d at 427; 3 PLANIOL no. 1738.
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co-legatee, which is covered in the earlier part of this article.8 1
In Pitre v. Pitre, 2 the French interpretation of lesion in partitions as propounded by Planiol s 3 (and six other French commentators) was applied to the situation of a voluntary property partition after divorce. When the original partition was set aside,
the husband tendered the supplemental value, but the court of
appeal 4 was uncertain whether this method to avoid a new partition was in accordance with Civil Code article 140885 and the
Planiol interpretation 6 of the French counterpart. Accordingly,
the court of appeal certified questions of law to the Supreme
Court,8 7 where the Planiol quotation was relied upon for the decision that the correct interpretation of Civil Code article 1408
did not enable the husband to ignore or circumvent the prior
judgment which had rescinded and annulled the original partition and which had become final. In another case,88 the civil law
technique of analogy and the views expressed in Planiol8 9 (and
three other French works) directed the application of the rules
limiting the delegation of authority by testamentary executors
to a problem concerning a testamentary attorney.
Succession of Bendily9° involved the validity of an olographic
will. One digit in the date was unclear, consisting of a 3 and a 5
superimposed together. Louisiana Civil Code article 1588 (and
the corresponding Code Napolgon article 970) provides that an
olographic will must be entirely written, dated, and signed by
the testator. The court's conclusion that the will was not valid
on account of failure to meet the requirement of certainty as to
date is based upon the interpretation of prior Louisiana cases,
in particular one 1945 decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court 9'
which cited and quoted from twelve different French authors
to the same effect, including the then current treatise of Planiol
81. Succession

of Williams, 124 So. 2d 924

(La. App. 4th Cir. 1960),

dis-

cussed in text accompanying notes 37-39 supra.
82. 162 So. 2d 430 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964), writs granted, 246 La. 597, 165
So. 2d 486 (1964), and judgment of court of appeal affirmed on ground of constructive fraud (no citation of Planiol) in 247 La. 594, 172 So. 2d 693 (1965).
83. 162 So. 2d 430, 431 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964) ; 3 PLANIOL no. 2423.
84. Pitre v. Pitre, 182 So. 2d 682 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
85. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1408 (1870) : "The defendant in the suit for rescission
may stop its course and prevent a new partition 'by offering and givirg to the
plaintiff the supplement of his hereditary portion, either ill money or in kind,
provided the rescission is not demanded for cause of violence or fraud."
86. 3 PLANIOL no. 2430.
87. 248 La. 925, 183 So. 2d 307 (1966).
88. Succession of Zatarain, 138 So. 2d 163 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
89. Id.

at 167; 3 PLANIOL no. 2814.

90. 132 So. 2d 693, 696 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
91. Succession of Buck. 208 La. 556, 23 So. 2d 215 (1945).
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& Ripert. The court in the present case might have cited the new
Planiol translation, 2 but did not do so; the numerous citations
quoted from the 1945 decision were compiled before the translation was available. In any event, the French sources were used
to confirm and corroborate the existing interpretation of the
Louisiana jurisprudence; the court here used the supporting
effect of French authorities in reversing a trial court decision
which had treated the will as valid.
In Successions of Webre,93 there were several issues (includ94
ing simulation and prescription) but the only Planiol citation
appeared in a footnote as a general reference for the principle
that collation arises from an obligation or duty imposed upon
the heir by law. The right to enforce this duty is restricted to
the co-heirs, and since this constitutes a personal action it would
be subject to the general liberative prescription of ten years.
(4) Obligations. As might well be expected, the largest
number of Planiol citations occurred within the broad scope of
obligations, which is the most technical and abstract as well as
the most fundamental branch of the civil law. To indicate more
specific topical distribution of the cases in this group, there are
2 cases involving solidary obligations, 3 which deal with terms
and conditions, 2 with aspects of extinction of obligations, 2 ou
civil responsibility, 3 on res judicata, 2 on quasi-contract and
simulation, also single cases on offer and acceptance, stipulation
pour autrui, recovery of the undue, future things, nullities, and
the classification of a cause of action.
Looking at these cases from the functional use of the Planiol
reference, there are 9 in which Planiol is cited by way of supplement to Louisiana (and other) authorities 95 as compared with
92. 3 PLANIOL no. 2692.
93. 247 La. 461, 172 So. 2d 285 (1965), reversing and remanding, 164 So. 2d
49 (l.a.App. 4th Cir. 1964), discussed in text accompanying note 149 infra.

94. 247 La. 461, 473, 172 So. 2d 285, 289
2214.

(1965); 3 PLANIOL nos. 2211,

95. Hidalgo v. Dupuy, 122 So. 2d 639, 644 (La. App. Ist Cir.
cussed in text accompanying notes 35-36 supra; Keller v. Thompson,
395, 397 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961) ; Murphy v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of
138 So. 2d 132, 137 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962), subsequent appeal in

1960), dis134 So. 2d
New York,
same case,

165 So. 2d 497 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964) ; Davis v. LeBlanc, 149 So. 2d 252, 254
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1963) ; Plaquemines Equipment & Machine Co. v. Ford Motor
Co.,
148
'Gas
Co.
158

245 La. 201, 205 nn.2, 4, 157 So. 2d 884, 885 n.2, 886 n.4 (1963), affirming
So. 2d 815 (lfa. App. 4th Cir. 1963) ; American Mfr's Mut. Ins. Co. v. United
Corp., 159 So. 2d 592, 596 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964) ; National Crankshaft
v. Natural Gas Industries, 246 La. 395, 400, 165 So. 2d 1, 3 (1964), annulling
So. 2d 370 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963) ; Redd v. Bohannon, 166 So. 2d 362, 364
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3 in which Planiol (and other French works) seems to be the
primary source of reliance with supplementation of Louisiana
cases."" In 2 cases Planio 97 and Pothier,9 8 respectively, are cited
to confirm and corroborate the prior Louisiana jurisprudence so
as to preclude a change in the interpretation. In two cases,
Planiol is relied on together with Louisiana (and other) authorities.9 9 There are also 6 cases in which the decision relies even
more substantially or exclusively on Planiol and other (French
and Louisiana) doctrinal materials. 10 0
The facts and detailed issues in each of these cases would
become too tedious for this article. In many instances, there is
the preliminary establishment of the similarity between the
Louisiana and the French civil code provisions, and "for this
reason, we have found of unusual interest the comments of
Planiol"'' 1 and other commentaries to clarify the meaning or
fix the correct interpretation. Of particular interest, mention
may be made of the following ways in which the Planiol reference was used.
Great American Indemnity Co. v. Dauzat'0 2 involved the claim
for recovery of a payment which was allegedly not due. The
pertinent Louisiana Civil Code articles 2301 et seq., being similar to Code Napolgon articles 1376 et seq., and there being "no
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1964) ; Quinette v. Delhommer, 247 La. 1121, 176 So. 2d 399,
405 (1965).
96. Tolbird v. Cooper, 243 La. 306, 313-19, 143 So. 2d 80, 83-85 (1962)
Teche Concrete, Inc. v. Moity, 168 So. 2d 347, 353 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964),
writ denied, "no error of law," 247 La. 251, 170 So. 2d 509 (1965) ; Wagenvoord
Broadcasting Co. v. Canal Automatic Transmission Service, Inc., 176 So. 2d 188,
190 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
97. Dalton v. Suhren, 128 So. 2d 456, 458 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961).
98. Harvey v. Travelers Ins. Co., 163 So. 2d 915, 921 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1964).
99. Lafleur v. Guillory, 181 So. 2d 323, 326, 327, 328 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965),
writ refused, "result is correct," 248 La. 1099, 184 So. 2d 24 (1966); Nelson v.
Walker, 189 So. 2d 54, 62-63 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
100. Daum v. Lehde, 239 La. 607, 613, 119 So. 2d 481, 483 (1960), discussed
in text accompanying notes 29-30 supra; Richmond v. Krusevski, 243 La. 777,
785, 147 So. 2d 212, 214 (1962), annulling 139 So. 2d 290 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1962) ; Great American Indcm. Co. v. Dauzat, 157 So. 2d 308, 310-11 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1963) ; Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Lewis, 245 La. 499, 513 n.3, 159
So.2d 132, 137 n.3 (1963), affirming 150 So. 2d 796 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963);
Welsh v. Myatt, 164 So. 2d 393, 394 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964), writ refused, "on
the facts found . . . result is correct,"

246 La. 590, 165 So. 2d 484

(1964);

Cox v. Aldrich, 247 La. 797, 817, 174 So. 2d 634, 641 (1965), affirming 162
So. 2d 18 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).
101. Murphy v. Fidelity Cas. Co. of New York, 138 So. 2d 132, 137 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1962).
102. 157 So. 2d 308 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
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Louisiana cases directly applicable to the issues here involved,"
103
the court continued "we have therefore turned to Planiol."'
In the case with the problem about a stipulation pour autrui,1 4 a concurring opinion included Planiol' 05 as a reference
in support of pointing up one aspect not dealt with in the majority decision, namely, that even if a stipulation pour autrui
had been completed by the third person's acceptance, this constituted acceptance also of the provisions of the contract whereby certain rights of modification had been reserved.
An interesting and a different kind of a use of Planiol was
made in Davis v. LeBlanc,l 6 where the issue centered on the
question whether a judgment creditor was entitled to automatic
interest under a statute which established this right for judgments "sounding in damages ex delicto."'07 To classify the nature of the cause of action in the present case, the court cited
some Louisiana decisions and also Planiol's' 08 comments about
the older doctrine in France which distinguished between contractual and delictual fault - without, however, referring to
Planiol's further comments three sections later'0 9 which refute
the distinction in favor of the more recent concept that there
is unity of fault rather than a dualism. Nevertheless, while this
unity concept may serve well some of the modern problems of
responsibility, it will not help resolve questions of liberative
prescription where there are different periods for actions ex
contractu and ex delicto; furthermore, in the present case, the
decision is limited to the interpretation of the phrase "ex delicto"
in a Louisiana statute where the intention obviously was to
draw a distinction.
Another interesting use of Planiol was made in the case of
Teche Concrete, Inc. v. Moity," 0 where simulation was found in
the defendant's establishment of a corporation and in a lease
agreement between the defendant and the corporation. In addition to Louisiana doctrinal materials and cases in support of
its decision, the court also utilized the "pr6te-nom" concept, cit103. Id. at 310-11 ; 2 PLANIOL nos. 835 et seq.
104. Cox v. Aldrich, 247 La. 797, 174 So. 2d 634 (1965).
105. Id. at 817, 174 So. 2d at 641; 2 PLANIOL nos. 1247, 1261.
106. 149 So. 2d 252

(La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).

107. LA. R.S. 13:4203 (1950).
108. 149 So. 2d.252, 254 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963) ; 2 PLANIOL no. 873.
109. 2 PLANIOL nos. 876-877.
110. 168 So. 2d 347 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964), writs denied, "no error of law,"

247 La. 1.51, 170 So. 2d 509 (1965).
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ing the Planiol treatise"' as the first and the most comprehensive of the references in this connection. Simulation and use
of the pr~te-nom concept were also the basis of decision in Lafleur v. Guillory.1' 2 The court found there was simulation in
the acquisition of property by a son who was really acting as
pr6te-nom for his father, as evidenced by the son's counter-letter;
the decision made significant use of Planiol'13 in holding that the
father was the real purchaser and that the property fell into
the community prior to its partition after a divorce.
In Quinette v. Delhommer,1 14 there was a problem of res
judicata, and on the question of who were the ayants cause, or
successors, of the parties of record, according to civil law doctrine, Planiol"1 5 was cited along with Pothier and a series of
Louisiana cases. In Nelson v. Walker,1 6 the majority held that a
community property settlement, after separation and before divorce, which contained a waiver of the wife's right to claim alimony, was contrary to a prohibitory law'1 and against public
policy, and therefore was an absolute nullity; the dissenting
judge cited Planiol '"5 in support of his opinion that the property
transfer was only a relative nullity and therefore susceptible of
ratification and prescription.
A basic problem of offer and acceptance, involving the revocation of an offer prior to notification of its acceptance, was at
issue in Wagenvoord.BroadcastingCo. v. Canal Automatic Transmission Service."1 9 In asserting the receipt theory of acceptance,
the court quoted Planiol' 20 as its first authority. It is noteworthy
that with reference to the duration of irrevocability of an offer,
the same decision quoted from (1) a Toullier extract cited in
a prior Louisiana case 12 1 and (2) a law review comment which
1 22
in turn relied most extensively on French authorities.
111. 168 So. 2d 347, 353 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1946); 2 PLANIOL nos. 1189,
1198, 2271, 2272.
112. 181 So. 2d 323 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965), writ refused, "result is correct,"
248 La. 1099, 184 So. 2d 24 (1966).
113. Quotations from 2 PLANIOL nos. 1186, 1189, 2266, 2268(2), and citation
of nos. 1186-1190.
114. 247 La. 1121, 176 So. 2d 399 (1965).
115. 2 PLANIOL no. 54A (4).
116. 189 So. 2d 54 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
117. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2446 (1870).
118. 2 PLANIOL nos. 1438, 1439.
119. 176 So. 2d 188 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
120. 2 PLANIOL no. 984.
121. National Co. v. Navarro, 149 So. 2d 648 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
122. Pascal, Duration and Revocability of an Offer, 1 LA. L. REV. 182 (1938).
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(5) Special Contracts. A respect for doctrine even as
against judicial decision was asserted in two cases which hinged
on the validity of a pledge. In 1960, the Orleans (Fourth Circuit) Court of Appeal 123 refused to accept a 1956 holding of the
Louisiana Supreme Court 124 that as between the parties delivery
of possession to the creditor is not necessary; the lower appellate court found support in Planiol and in the critical observations of two law professors published in local law reviews. This
25
case was discussed above.1
Perhaps even more significant was a similar pledge case
four years later before a different court of appeal. 126 As between the 1956 decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court and the
1960 decision of another coordinate appellate court, the language
in the former was disapproved and the latter was followed with
extensive quotations including the professors' comments and the
Planiol treatise to the effect that without delivery there can be
no pledge. In this manner, what might have become a trend
started by the 1956 Supreme Court decision was deflected by
the lower appellate courts with the aid of doctrinal support.
Of the four cases dealing with problems of sale, an interesting use of Planiol was made in Steib v. Joseph Rathbone Land
Co. 127 One party contended that the transaction was a sale with
right of redemption (vente 4 rgmgrg), but the court dismissed
this view upon finding that the facts of this transaction did not
meet the necessary attributes of a sale with right of redemption
as enumerated and described by Planiol. 128 In Womack v. Sternberg,129 the dissenting Justice cited Planiol (and other French
works) in three contexts: (1) that an exchange of properties is
really two sales, 130 with the ensuing legal consequences, (2) that
punitive damages are not permitted in the civil law, 131 and (3)
that the French practice of judicial discretion to fix the time for
123. Kreppein v. Demarest, 120 So. 2d 301 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1960).
124. Scott v. Corkern, 231 La. 368, 91 So. 2d 569 (1956).
125. See text accompanying notes 31-34 supra.
126. Powers v. Motors Securities Co., 168 So. 2d 922, 925 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1964), writ rejused, "on the facts found . . . there appears no error of law,"
247 La. 257, 170 So. 2d 511 (1965).
127. 163 So. 2d 429 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964), writ denied, "result ...
correct," 246 La. 376, 164 So. 2d 361 (1964).
128. 163 So. 2d 429, 433 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964) ; 2 PLANIOL no. 1582.
129. 247 La. 566, 172 So. 2d 683 (1965), annulling damages and remandinq
162 So. 2d 119 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).
130. 247 La. 566, 583, 172 So. 2d 683, 689 (1965) ; 2 PLANIOL no. 1658.
131. 247 La. 566, 586, 172 So. 2d 683, 690 n.2 (1965) ; 2 PLANIOL no. 247.
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evaluating damages for breach of contract 13 2 is preferable to
the rigid rule of the time of the breach which was being enforced by the majority in this case. The two other sales cases
simply used the Planiol citation as a general reference for the
34
33
subjects of lesion beyond moiety' and promise of sale.1
In one lease case, 85 the lessor refused the tenant's request
for permission to sublease and then the lessor rented other
premises to the same person. In the tenant's suit for cancellation of his lease and for damages, the court held that the lessor
cannot "unreasonably, arbitrarily or capriciously" refuse his
consent where there is no express prohibition to sublease. The
only authority cited by the court was Planiol, 136 where this view
is set out on the basis of three cases in the French jurisprudence.
8
Two other lease cases dealt with lease of services: in one case,' T
PlanioJ138 was cited as a general reference for a discussion about
"work by the job or contract"; and in the other, 139 the decision
to place the burden of loss on the owner for rain damage caused
in the middle of a construction job, was based primarily on the
Louisiana jurisprudence, but the court added that the result was
in accord with both the French commentators 1 40 and the common law, giving several citations of each. While it is safe to
say that the French references did not affect the decision, it is
a useful indication of a growing habit to consult them in appropriate situations.
132. 247 La. 566, 590, 172 So. 2d 683, 691-92 (1965); DALLOZ, CODE CIVIL
458, art. 1149 n.4 (1958); 3 FUZIER-HERMAN, CODE CIVIL ANNOT t
268, art. 1149 n.9 (1936); 7 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT
CIVIL FRANVAIS 185, no. 856 (1954) ; 2 RIPERT ET BOULANGER, TRAITtIk~LMENANNOTi

TAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL DE PLANIOL 260, no. 744bis (4th ed. 1952).

133. Hemenway Furniture Co. v. Corbett, 126 So. 2d 666, 671 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1961).
134. Bornemann v. Richards, 245 La. 851, 859, 161 So. 2d 741, 744 (1964),
reversing 153 So. 2d 456 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963). The accuracy of this decision
has been questioned, and the possibility of its being based directly on French
authorities has been suegested, but these issues are not Within the scope of the
present article. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 19631964 Term -7 Sales, 25 LA. L. REV. 325, 326-28 (1965) and Note, 25 LA. L. REV.
569 (1965).
135. Gamble v. New Orleans Housing Mart, Inc., 154 So. 2d 625 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1963), writ refused, "judgment is not final. Applicant is reserved the
right ....
" 244 La. 1027, 156 So.2d 229 (1963).
136. 154 So. 2d 625, 627 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963); 2 PLANIOL no. 1752,
n.42.
137. Airco Refrigeration Service, Inc. v. Fink, 242 La. 73, 134 So. 2d 880
(1961), affirming 127 So. 2d 290 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961).
138. 242 La. 73, 79, 134 So. 2d 880, 882 n.3 (1961); 2 PLANIOL nos. 18971901.
139. S. & W. Investment Co. v. Sharp & Son, 162 So. 2d 171 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1964), reversed, 247 L,. 158, 170 So. 2d 360 (1965).
140. 162 So. 2d 171, 176 n.4 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964) ; Dalloz R~p., Duvergier,
Pothier, Guillouard, Troplong, Domat.
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In Union Producing Co. v. Schneider,141 an instrument purporting to be a compromise was unenforceable because not all
the interested parties had participated in the agreement. The
whole unit of Planiol 42 on compromise is cited for a general
discussion of the subject; and a more specific citation of Plani01143 is given in support of distinguishing a previous decision of
the Louisiana Supreme Court where the document contained all
the signatures involved in the disputed property interest. Although both of these Planiol citations are introduced by the formula "e.g.," the latter is relied on substantially for the principle
that compromise is declarative and not translative - as applied
in the court's decision.
(6) Prescription. In liberative prescription (statute of limitations), the periods designated for the loss of a right of action
vary considerably so that much of the litigation in this area centers on the classification of the nature of the cause of action.
Thus, actions resulting from offenses and quasi offenses (torts)
are prescribed in one year, 1 44 actions under certain enumerated
contracts prescribe in three or five years, 145 and ten years is the
prescriptive period for all personal actions not expressly provided for.146 Sometimes the judicial classification of the action
seems to be more a matter of policy as to particular result than
analysis of legal concepts.
47
In Reserve Ins. Co. v. Fabre,1
more than one year but less
than ten years had elapsed when suit was instituted. The insurance company had paid for certain car accident damages, and in
due course brought this suit against the borrower of the car
whose negligence had caused the accident. The court dismissed
the contention that the action was ex delicto (one-year prescription) and held that it was ex contractu (ten-year prescription)
because the insurer's action was based upon its subrogation to
the car owner's right under the contract of loan which placed
a duty of care on the borrower. For a discussion of the distinction between contractual fault and delictual fault, the court

141.
142.
143.
2296.
144.
145.
146.
147.
1st Cir.

131 So. 2d 133 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
Id. at 138; 2 PLANIOL nos. 2285-2301.
131 So. 2d 133, 139 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961); 2

PLANIOL

nos. 2295,

LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3536 (1870).
Id. arts. 3538-3539, 3540-3543.
Id. art. 3544.
243 La. 982, 149 So. 2d 413 (1963), annulling 140 So. 2d 438 (La. App.
1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 816 (1963).
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cited and quoted Planio114 8 as the principal reference (along with
Laurent and Dalloz' Codes Annot6s).
Another case '19 involved the classification of a claim for collation in a succession which the court held to be a personal
action and therefore subject to the ten-year prescription. Although there is no reference to Planiol, the court placed considerable reliance upon two local law review items5' ° which cite
several French treatises prior to the Planiol English translation.
In acquisitive prescription (adverse possession), most of the
basic principles follow the French pattern so that doctrinal consultation is in order. A significant case of this sort was Southern Natural Gas Co. v. Naquin,5'1 where the court found no
other direct authority and "applying the explanation of the law
as expressed by Planiol"15 2 held that a co-owner in indivision
is a precarious possessor as to the other co-owners and cannot
prescribe against them.
In one case,1 53 the court quoted from Planioll54 (along with
Louisiana and common law authorities) to support the conclusion that acquisitive prescription covers the situation of a possession which may have been based on a title or deed which has
been lost or not based on any writing at all.
In another case, 155 the court cited Planiol 56 as a general reference on the subject of tacking (joining) of successive possessions by different persons as distinguished from the continuation
by a universal heir of the decedent's possession. The facts of
this case were very involved and the litigation resulted in several
judgments at different levels, including reversals, and it has
148. 243 La. 982, 990, 149 So. 2d 413, 416 (1963) ; 2 PLANIOL no. 873; cf.
Davis v. LeBlanc, 149 So. 2d 252 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963), discussed in text
accompanying notes 106-109 supra.
149. Successions of Webre, 164 So. 2d 49 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964), reversed
and remanded for the purpose of establishing certain elements of evidence, 247 La.
461, 172 So. 2d 285 (1965), discussed in text accompanying notes 93-94 supra.
150. Comment, Collation in Louisiana-Prescription,27 TUL. L. REV. 241
(1953) ; Note, Successions-- Collation -Prescription,
3 LA. L. REV. 460 (1941).
151. 167 So. 2d 434 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964), writ refused, "no error of law,"

246 La. 884, 168 So. 2d 268 (1964).
152. 167 So. 2d 434, 439 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964) ; 1 PLANIOL no. 2313.
153. Lincoln Parish School Board v. Ruston College, 162 So. 2d 419 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1964), writ denied, "judgment is correct," 246 La. 355, 164 So. 2d
354 (1964).
154. 162 So. 2d 419, 423 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964) ; 1 PLANIOL no. 2645.
155. Noel v. Jumonville Pipe & Machinery Co., 245 La. 324, 158 So. 2d 179
(1963), reversing 148 So. 2d 891 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).

156. 245 La. 324, 342-43, 347-48, n.1, 158 So. 2d 179, 186, 188 n.1 (1963);
1 PLANIOL nos. 2673-2674.
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been discussed in local doctrinal commentaries. 157 Whether more
extensive consultation of Planiol (and other French works) and
analysis of the legal concepts, especially precarious possession,
might have resulted in a different decision, is not within the
scope of this study.
III.

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

For the period between October 1959 (when the Planiol translation became available) and September 1966, the reported decisions of the Louisiana courts are contained in volumes 237-249
of the Louisiana Reports (Supreme Court only) and in volumes
112-189 of the Southern Reporter, Second Series (Supreme Court
and courts of appeal). There are a number of ways in which
the pertinent information can be classified and analyzed, and
there is nothing sacramental about the patterns herein utilized;
what follows is an attempt to make an objective presentation
in relation to the purpose of the inquiry.
(1) Number of citations. The Planiol translation became
available in October 1959, and the first decision to cite it was
handed down on November 16, 1959. Sixty-two cases were found
to contain citations to Planiol (and sometimes also to other
French works) and, with citations for more than one issue in
some of the cases, there is a total of 67 citations which were examined. No attempt was made to obtain exact data on the preceding seven-year period, or any other recent similar period, for
the purpose of comparison; nor can it be said that there is likely
to be found any such period of time during which there were
absolutely no citations to French doctrinal materials in the Louisiana judicial decisions. However, it is safe to say that since
the turn of the century such references had been rare rather
than frequent.
(2) Subject Matter. A classification of the cases according
to subject matter would ordinarily be made on the basis of the
holding or ratio decidendi of the essential or critical issue of the
decision. However, for the present purposes, the subject matter classification has been made in terms of the issues in connection with which the Planiol reference was made. Furthermore, to follow the civil law framework and to minimize the sig157. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1963-1964 Term Acquisitive Prescription, 25 LA. L. REv. 352, 353-54 (1965); Note, 24 LA. L.
REv. 888 (1964).
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nificant categories, the cases were arranged in 6 groups according to the principal divisions of the Civil Code. Thus, the 62
cases included 8 in the field of persons and family, 7 in property,
10 in successions, 22 in obligations, 10 in special contracts, and
5 in prescription. The subdivisional groupings are indicated in
the description of the cases. Comments are reserved for the
concluding section of this article.
(3) Courts. The appellate courts of Louisiana include the
Supreme Court and the courts of appeal. Prior to 1960, there
were the First Circuit Court of Appeal, the Second Circuit Court
of Appeal, and the Orleans Court of Appeal. With the 1960
judicial reorganization, there came into being the First, Second,
Third, and Fourth Circuit Courts of Appeal, the last one replacing the Orleans Court. The expanded intermediate appellate
courts not only met the increasing need at that level but they
also became the courts of last resort for many kinds of cases
in order to alleviate the burden on the Supreme Court.
Without going into the relative total volume of cases in each
of these courts or the possible differences in the distribution of
subject matter, it may be noted that the 62 cases and 67 Planiol
citations covered in this analysis include all the Louisiana appellate courts and are divided among them as follows: Supreme
Court, 19 cases with 22 citations; First Circuit, 6 cases with 6
citations; Second Circuit, 7 cases with 9 citations; Third Circuit, 19 cases with 19 citations; and Fourth Circuit, 11 cases
with 11 citations.
(4) Judges. The Supreme Court has a bench of 7 Justices,
the First Circuit Court of Appeal has 5 judges, the Second Circuit has 4, the Third Circuit has 5, and the Fourth Circuit has 6.
This makes a total of 27. However, during the period covered,
more than this number of persons have actually served on these
courts because there have been replacements on account of death,
retirement, resignation, term expiration, and sometimes the service of a person as judge pro tem. This inclusive total comes to
36,158 of whom some only served for relatively short periods.
Without considering (or researching) the possibility that
some judges may be writing the opinions in cases of certain sub158. According to lists in front of Southern Reporter volumes. These do not
always include all the short ad hoc assignments which, however, do not materially
affect the significance of the analysis.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVII

ject matter which may be conducive to the use of Planiol references (or the opposite), and noting that the Planiol citations
examined were found not only in the court's majority but also
in some concurring (3) and dissenting (5) opinions, the 67
Planiol citations were distributed among the judges in the following manner.
In the Supreme Court, ten Justices served during the period
covered. Three Justices served a relatively short time, leaving
the court by reason of death, resignation, and expiration of a
temporary assignment, respectively. The seven Justices presently on the court have all cited Planiol: two Justices each did
so 8 times, one made 2 references, and the other four each
made one.
Among the Circuit Court judges there were two deaths, one
retirement, and quite a few temporary assignments. The Planiol
citations are found in the following distribution: one judge accounted for 11 citations, another judge for 6, one judge for 3,
seven judges for 2 each, and ten judges one each. One opinion
was per curiam.
An observation of more than passing interest is that in March
1964, the writer spoke on the same subject of this article at a
conference of the judges of the Louisiana courts of appeal, at
which time there had been reported 34 Planiol citations in 32
cases for the period of October 1959 to February 1964 and covering volumes 112-160 of the Southern Reporter, Second Series.
The present report covers only about 30 additional months (to
September 1966) and 29 more volumes, but the Planiol citations
now total 67 in 62 cases.
It may also be noted that seven of the judges who were then
(March 1964) on the appellate courts and who had not previously included any Planiol citations in their opinions, did so
afterwards.
(5) Use of the Planiol citations. An examination of the
cases containing citations to Planiol (and sometimes to other
French works) discloses several differences in the manner and
purpose of using this reference. A classification of these different kinds of use can not be as objective as the mathematical distribution of numbers, but neither is there likely to be more than
minor variation among different readers. In any event, on the
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basis of the way in which opinions are written and references
included, the following classification has been adopted for a tabulation of the 67 citations covered in this analysis.
The largest category comprises the 38 (56.5%) instances in
which Planiol is cited along with Louisiana and other authorities.
To make this more meaningful, these are subdivided into (a) 17
where Planiol is cited as an addition or supplement to other references which are mostly Louisiana authorities, (b) 10 citations
of Planiol as the first authority and supplemented by Louisiana
cases, etc., (c) 5 instances in which Planiol seems to be introduced for the purpose of confirming or corroborating the Louisiana jurisprudence thereby precluding a possible modification
or change, and (d) 6 cases where the court seemed to rely on a
combination of the Planiol and Louisiana and possibly other authorities. Here again, there may well be differences among readers as to whether there is any significance to these four (or more
or less) subdivisions; and the distinction between (a), (c),
and (d) is sometimes hard to identify. However, there is a difference between the (a) type use of the Planiol when it is part
of a "see also" reference, after a number of Louisiana authorities, and the (b) type citation of Planiol (often with quotation)
as the first reference, with the Louisiana cases or other materials in the "see also" group. The (c) and (d) subdivisions are
sometimes suggested by the context and the manner of expression in relation to the decision on the point involved.
The next largest category comprises the 16 (24%) instances
in which the judge appeared to rely deliberately on Planiol for
his decision (or dissent). In 6 of these cases there is very substantial reliance, while in 10 instances the citations to Planiol
(and sometimes to other French works) appear as the exclusive
references for the particular decision or interpretation.
A third major group consists of the 8 (12%) situations in
which Planiol is cited as a general reference for the principle or
institution being considered.
A fourth group contains 4 (6%) instances in which Planiol is
cited to support a position opposed to the existing Louisiana
jurisprudence.
And there is also 1 (1.5%) instance where Planiol is cited
to describe the French position which was rejected as being
inapplicable in Louisiana.
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EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION

To estimate the significance of the number of references to
Planiol and other French works after 1959, there ought to be
the same accurate data for the time before 1959. These data
were not researched, but it was not considered necessary for the
present purposes. So many members of the local profession have
been reading all the Louisiana judicial decisions that their unanimous testimony has been accepted as satisfactory evidence of the
paucity of such references. The exact number is not important
enough to warrant the time and effort that would be required
to establish it. The same witnesses attest to the fact that since
1959 here has been a vigorous and steadily increasing movement
in this direction. The judges themselves are the first to confirm this fact. Furthermore, there is the statistical evidence
that in 30 months from April 1964 to September 1966 there were
approximately as many (33) Planiol citations in about one-half
of the time, as there were (34) in the first 54 months after the
appearance of the Planiol translation from October 1959 to
March 1964. In other terms, these figures show that during the
first 41/2 years the citations appeared at the rate of 7.5 per year,
whereas during the 21/2 years which followed the citation rate
increased to 13.2 per year. Since the whole purpose of the
translation was that it be used, the evidence establishes a successful record together with a cumulative effect. It is becoming
a dangerous calculated risk for an attorney not to check Planiol
before submitting his case to court.
The analysis of the subject matter shows the kind of distribution which might well have been expected. One half (32)
of the cases (with 36 Planiol citations) are in the fields of obligations and special contracts. Successions give rise to litigious
disputes and account for 10 cases (with 11 references), whereas over the years there has been less litigation over property
concepts as reflected by 7 Planiol citations. In the field of
persons and family law, there has been a fair amount of legislation which established new principles and directions different
from the French law, but there were still 8 references to Planiol.
As for prescription, both liberative and acquisitive, the Louisiana jurisprudence has pretty well established the guidelines so
that there were only 5 Planiol references. The abstract and
technical nature of the innumerable legal problems in obligations and special contracts will probably continue to make this
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the field in which there will be the greatest use of Planiol and
other French works. In any event, it can .hardly be said that
the subject matter distribution is very important except that
the areas of obligations and special contracts are likely to remain among the most litigious of private law and the multiplication of references to Planiol and other French works is likely
to continue.
All the appellate courts have been citing Planiol. The Supreme Court's leadership with 22 references is not only an example which other courts may well seek to emulate but attorneys
are very likely to make careful note of this fact and prepare
their briefs accordingly. Likewise, a similar effect may well
follow from the facts that two very prominent Justices of the
Supreme Court have each made 8 references, while two of the
outstanding court of appeal judges have included 11 and 6 citations, respectively. The Circuit Court which showed the fewest
Planiol references is the one which, during the period covered, had the most changes (2 deaths) and temporary assignments (2).
Twenty-seven appellate judges have cited Planiol and other
French works during the period covered. Of the remainder,
two died and one resigned not long after the appearance of the
Planiol translation, and some were on temporary assignments.
From these figures, it is not presumptuous to draw the extremely significant conclusion that the Louisiana appellate
judges, both individually and as a body, favor and encourage
the use of Planiol in working out solutions for our legal problems in appropriate cases.
The evaluation of the actual uses of the Planiol citations-has
been incorporated in the description of the cases and in the
statistical analysis. The classification and distribution of these
uses covers the fairly comprehensive range that might have
been expected. Attorneys will emphasize Planiol as much as
possible to support their arguments, or try to minimize its relevance when Planiol leans the other way. The law schools, not
only in Louisiana but also in other states and English language
countries, are already making considerable use of the Planiol
translation in connection with instructional programs and comparative law research, and this is bound to increase.
As far as the courts are concerned, it must be kept in mind
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that judges must follow the time-honored requirement of giving
reasons and authority for their decisions. If the question is a
new one in Louisiana on an issue concerning which the civil
codes of France and Louisiana are similar, it is now unlikely
that reference to Planiol will be overlooked or omitted. If the
case involves a problem on which the Louisiana interpretations
have not been consistent, the reference to Planiol may help stabilize the situation one way or the other. If there is a gap in the
Louisiana law on a subject for which the general source was
French, the chances of following Planiol must be very good.
If the Louisiana juisprudence has answered the question in litigation, the Planiol position to the same effect may be useful
in precluding a change in the Louisiana interpretation. On the
other hand, if the established Louisiana interpretation produces a result which is no longer socially desirable, the availability of a Planiol position (along with the French jurisprudence) to the contrary, may well assist a Louisiana court in
moving towards a change. In one case 15 9 the Supreme Court
relied principally on Pothier and Planiol to reverse a decision of
the court of appeal and distinguish as inapplicable the Louisiana
cases on which it had rested.
Judges reach for the decisions which conform to the law and
at the same time produce the socially desirable results, in a wide
range of situations. Whether it be the one extreme or "making
new law" and needing some authority to support the conclusion, or whether it be the other extreme of having to apply
the law that is clear and free from any possibility of ambiguity
despite its harshness (tex dura lex), there is room for, and likely
to be an increasing use of the Planiol translation by the Louisiana courts.
By way of conclusion, two observations may be made. One
is that there are many ways in which the comparative law
method may be utilized in judicial decision. The use of materials from a legal system other than one's own and the information about the experience and solutions of other systems can
clarify issues and show up distinctions in a convincing manner.
New solutions may be adopted from other sources if the results
are socially desirable and compatible with local legal institutions. Even more effective is the consultation of the history
and interpretation as well as the subsequent developments in
159. Richmond v. Krushevski, 243 La. 777, 147 So. 2d 212 (1962).
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the legal system in which the local law has many of its own
roots. The English translation of Planiol serves not only all of
these possibilities but at the same time it encourages and facilitates inquiry into other French authorities in the original,
by providing an access bridge together with direction.
The final observation is perhaps the most significant one.
This comparative method of the use of Planiol by the legal
profession and the courts in Louisiana is reviving and re-establishing the habit of civil-law method and technique in dealing
with legal problems. For some time, the lawyers and judges
had been indulging heavily in the common-law method of citing
cases, Corpus Juris, American Jurisprudence, and so forth. This
will undoubtedly continue in some measure; however, the proportion will change with the leavening effect of considering
more doctrinal materials and giving them a more active part in
the decision-reaching process, and by looking with more penetration in the existing principles for solutions by analogy and more
imaginative interpretation. Along with the new and increasing
use of Planiol, the courts are also giving more consideration to
the local doctrinal materials in the Louisiana law reviews; a
number of the decisions in this survey relied exclusively on a
combination of French and Louisiana doctrine.
With the amount of general law, uniform law, and general
common law which is operative in Louisiana, it has become what
might be called a "mixed jurisdiction." In recent times, the
common-law methods and influences may have had a greater
role than was their due. Now, with the use being made of
French and Louisiana doctrinal materials, with more civil-law
translations available and in preparation, and with more Louisiana civil-law treatises being planned, there is new assurance
and strength in the preservation and development of the civillaw aspect in the mixed jurisdiction of the Louisiana legal
system.

